LAB 17: Zero Trust Identity Architecture

Identity Zero Trust Checklist: AUTHENTICATION: ✓ MFA for ALL users (no exceptions) ✓ Phishing-resistant MFA (FIDO2, passkeys) ✓ Risk-based authentication ✓ Passwordless where possible ✓ Session timeout enforcement AUTHORIZATION: ✓ Least privilege by default ✓ Just-in-Time (JIT) access for privileged roles ✓ Role-based access control (RBAC) ✓ Attribute-based access control (ABAC) for fine-grained ✓ Regular access reviews IDENTITY GOVERNANCE: ✓ Automated lifecycle management (JML) ✓ Access certification campaigns ✓ Segregation of duties (SoD) ✓ Privileged access management (PAM) ✓ Identity analytics and risk scoring

Navigate to: Entra ID → Security → Authentication methods FIDO2 Security Keys (Strongest): → Enable FIDO2 security keys → Allow self-service registration → Require attestation: Yes → Enforce key restrictions (if needed) Passkeys (Passwordless): → Enable Microsoft Authenticator (passwordless) → Configure for all users → Enable cross-platform passkeys Windows Hello for Business: → Enable for hybrid/cloud deployments → Require TPM 2.0 → Configure biometric requirements Disable Weak Methods: → Disable SMS authentication (SIM swap risk) → Disable Voice calls → Disable Email OTP Configure Authentication Strengths: → Security → Conditional Access → Authentication strengths → Create: "Phishing-Resistant MFA" - FIDO2 security key - Windows Hello for Business - Microsoft Authenticator (passkey)

Create Zero Trust Baseline Policy: Navigate to: Security → Conditional Access → New policy Policy 1: Require MFA for All Users Name: ZT-Baseline-RequireMFA Assignments: - Users: All users - Exclude: Break-glass accounts (emergency) Target Resources: - Cloud apps: All cloud apps Conditions: - (None - applies to all conditions) Access Controls: - Grant: Require authentication strength - Select: "Phishing-Resistant MFA" Session: - Sign-in frequency: 4 hours - Persistent browser session: No Enable policy: On --- Policy 2: Block Legacy Authentication Name: ZT-Block-LegacyAuth Users: All users Cloud apps: All cloud apps Conditions: - Client apps: Exchange ActiveSync, Other clients Access Controls: - Block This blocks protocols that don't support MFA!

Navigate to: Entra ID → Identity Governance → Privileged Identity Management Configure PIM for Entra ID Roles: → Entra ID roles → Settings For Global Administrator: → Edit → Activation Activation settings: - Maximum activation duration: 2 hours (not 8!) - Require justification: Yes - Require ticket information: Yes - Require approval: Yes - Approvers: Security team members Assignment settings: - Allow permanent eligible: No - Expire eligible after: 90 days - Require MFA on active assignment: Yes Notification settings: - Send notifications when eligible assigned - Send notifications when activated - Alert when admins activate Zero Trust PIM Principles: 1. No standing privileged access 2. Maximum 2-4 hour activation windows 3. Require approval for high-risk roles 4. Full audit trail 5. Regular eligibility reviews

Enable Identity Protection: → Security → Identity Protection Configure Risk Policies: User Risk Policy: → User risk remediation policy - User risk level: Medium and above - Access: Allow with password change required - Enforcement: On Sign-in Risk Policy: → Sign-in risk remediation policy - Sign-in risk level: Medium and above - Access: Allow with MFA required - Enforcement: On Create CA Policy for High Risk: Name: ZT-BlockHighRisk Conditions: - Sign-in risk: High - User risk: High Access Controls: - Block access --- Risk Signals Evaluated: - Impossible travel - Anonymous IP address - Malware-linked IP - Unfamiliar sign-in properties - Password spray detection - Leaked credentials

# AWS Identity Zero Trust Best Practices # 1. Require MFA for all console access # SCP to deny actions without MFA { "Version": "2012-10-17", "Statement": [ { "Sid": "DenyAllExceptListedIfNoMFA", "Effect": "Deny", "NotAction": [ "iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice", "iam:EnableMFADevice", "iam:GetUser", "iam:ListMFADevices", "sts:GetSessionToken" ], "Resource": "*", "Condition": { "BoolIfExists": { "aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "false" } } } ] } # 2. Use IAM Identity Center (not IAM users) # 3. Short session durations (4 hours max) # 4. Use roles, not long-term credentials # 5. Enable CloudTrail for all regions # 6. Use Permission Boundaries for delegation

Device Zero Trust Requirements: DEVICE IDENTITY: ✓ All devices enrolled in MDM/UEM ✓ Device certificates for authentication ✓ Hardware attestation (TPM) ✓ Device inventory maintained DEVICE HEALTH: ✓ Operating system up to date ✓ Antivirus/EDR running and updated ✓ Firewall enabled ✓ Disk encryption enabled ✓ No jailbreak/root detected (mobile) DEVICE COMPLIANCE: ✓ Compliance policies enforced ✓ Non-compliant devices blocked ✓ Real-time compliance monitoring ✓ Automated remediation DEVICE TYPES: ├── Corporate-managed (Full trust) ├── BYOD with MDM (Conditional trust) ├── BYOD without MDM (Limited trust) └── Unknown devices (No trust)

Navigate to: Microsoft Intune → Devices → Compliance policies Create Windows Compliance Policy: → Create policy → Windows 10 and later Device Health: ✅ Require BitLocker: Yes ✅ Require Secure Boot: Yes ✅ Require code integrity: Yes Device Properties: ✅ Minimum OS version: 10.0.19044 (21H2) ✅ Maximum OS version: (leave blank) System Security: ✅ Require password: Yes ✅ Minimum password length: 12 ✅ Password expiration: 90 days ✅ Require encryption: Yes ✅ Firewall: Required ✅ Antivirus: Required ✅ Antispyware: Required ✅ Real-time protection: Required Microsoft Defender for Endpoint: ✅ Require device to be at or under risk score: Medium Actions for non-compliance: - Mark device non-compliant: Immediately - Send email to user: After 1 day - Retire device: After 30 days (optional)

Create CA Policy for Device Compliance: Navigate to: Security → Conditional Access → New policy Policy: ZT-RequireCompliantDevice Assignments: - Users: All users - Exclude: Guest users (handle separately) Target Resources: - Cloud apps: Office 365, Salesforce, Critical Apps Conditions: - Device platforms: Windows, macOS, iOS, Android - Filter for devices: (optional - corporate only) Access Controls: - Grant: Require device to be marked as compliant - OR: Require Hybrid Azure AD joined device Session: - Continuous access evaluation: Enabled --- For BYOD/Unmanaged: Create separate policy with: - Require approved client app - Require app protection policy - Block download/copy (session controls)

Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Integration: Navigate to: security.microsoft.com → Settings → Endpoints Key Features for Zero Trust: 1. Real-Time Risk Scoring - Device risk score: Low/Medium/High - Feeds into Conditional Access 2. Threat & Vulnerability Management - Identifies unpatched software - Security recommendations - Feeds into compliance 3. Attack Surface Reduction - Block Office macros from child processes - Block credential stealing from LSASS - Block unsigned executables from USB 4. Automated Investigation & Response - Auto-quarantine malware - Isolate compromised devices - Collect forensic data Integration with Conditional Access: → Settings → Advanced features → Microsoft Intune connection: On Now Conditional Access can: - Block devices with high risk score - Require remediation before access

# AWS: Instance Identity for Workloads # EC2 instances have instance identity documents # Validate instance identity curl http://169.254.169.254/latest/dynamic/instance-identity/document # Use IAM roles attached to instances # Avoid storing credentials on instances # GCP: Confidential Computing # Enable Confidential VMs for sensitive workloads gcloud compute instances create secure-vm \ --confidential-compute \ --machine-type=n2d-standard-4 \ --min-cpu-platform="AMD Milan" \ --image-family=ubuntu-2204-lts \ --image-project=ubuntu-os-cloud # GCP: Shielded VMs gcloud compute instances create shielded-vm \ --shielded-secure-boot \ --shielded-vtpm \ --shielded-integrity-monitoring # Key principles: # 1. Workloads use managed identity (not keys) # 2. Network policies restrict workload communication # 3. Workload attestation before sensitive operations

Network Zero Trust Requirements: ELIMINATE IMPLICIT TRUST: ✓ No "trusted" network segments ✓ Corporate network = untrusted ✓ All traffic encrypted (TLS 1.3) ✓ No VPN-based full network access MICRO-SEGMENTATION: ✓ Workload-to-workload controls ✓ Application-level segmentation ✓ East-west traffic inspection ✓ Default deny between segments ZERO TRUST NETWORK ACCESS (ZTNA): ✓ Per-application access (not network) ✓ Identity-based access ✓ Device posture checked ✓ Continuous session validation NETWORK VISIBILITY: ✓ All traffic logged ✓ Network Detection & Response (NDR) ✓ DNS query logging ✓ Anomaly detection Traditional VPN vs ZTNA: VPN: Connect to network → access everything ZTNA: Authenticate → access one application

# Azure Network Security Groups (NSG) # Micro-segment by subnet and workload # Create NSG for web tier az network nsg create \ --name web-tier-nsg \ --resource-group production-rg # Allow only HTTPS from internet az network nsg rule create \ --nsg-name web-tier-nsg \ --name AllowHTTPS \ --priority 100 \ --direction Inbound \ --access Allow \ --protocol Tcp \ --destination-port-ranges 443 \ --source-address-prefixes Internet # Deny all other inbound az network nsg rule create \ --nsg-name web-tier-nsg \ --name DenyAllInbound \ --priority 4096 \ --direction Inbound \ --access Deny \ --protocol '*' \ --source-address-prefixes '*' # Application Security Groups (ASGs) # Group VMs by application function az network asg create --name web-servers-asg az network asg create --name api-servers-asg az network asg create --name db-servers-asg # Rule: Only web-servers can talk to api-servers az network nsg rule create \ --nsg-name api-tier-nsg \ --name AllowFromWebTier \ --source-asgs web-servers-asg \ --destination-asgs api-servers-asg \ --destination-port-ranges 8080

# AWS Zero Trust Network Design # 1. Separate VPCs per environment aws ec2 create-vpc --cidr-block 10.1.0.0/16 --tag "Name=production-vpc" aws ec2 create-vpc --cidr-block 10.2.0.0/16 --tag "Name=development-vpc" # 2. Private subnets (no internet gateway) aws ec2 create-subnet \ --vpc-id vpc-xxx \ --cidr-block 10.1.1.0/24 \ --tag "Name=private-app-subnet" # 3. Security Groups (stateful micro-segmentation) # Web tier SG aws ec2 create-security-group \ --group-name web-sg \ --description "Web tier - HTTPS only" aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \ --group-id sg-web \ --protocol tcp \ --port 443 \ --cidr 0.0.0.0/0 # App tier SG - only from web tier aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \ --group-id sg-app \ --protocol tcp \ --port 8080 \ --source-group sg-web # DB tier SG - only from app tier aws ec2 authorize-security-group-ingress \ --group-id sg-db \ --protocol tcp \ --port 5432 \ --source-group sg-app # 4. VPC Flow Logs for visibility aws ec2 create-flow-logs \ --resource-type VPC \ --resource-ids vpc-xxx \ --traffic-type ALL \ --log-destination-type cloud-watch-logs

# Kubernetes Network Policies for Zero Trust # Default deny all ingress apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: default-deny-all namespace: production spec: podSelector: {} policyTypes: - Ingress - Egress --- # Allow frontend to backend only apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: allow-frontend-to-backend namespace: production spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: backend policyTypes: - Ingress ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: app: frontend ports: - protocol: TCP port: 8080 --- # Allow backend to database only apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1 kind: NetworkPolicy metadata: name: allow-backend-to-db namespace: production spec: podSelector: matchLabels: app: database policyTypes: - Ingress ingress: - from: - podSelector: matchLabels: app: backend ports: - protocol: TCP port: 5432

ZTNA Solutions (Replace VPN): MICROSOFT: - Entra Private Access (preview) - Per-app tunnels - Integrates with Conditional Access CLOUDFLARE ACCESS: - Identity-aware proxy - No VPN client needed - Browser-based access ZSCALER PRIVATE ACCESS: - Software-defined perimeter - Inside-out connectivity - No inbound connections GOOGLE BEYONDCORP: - Original Zero Trust implementation - Context-aware access proxy - IAP (Identity-Aware Proxy) ZTNA Benefits over VPN: ✓ Application-level (not network) ✓ No lateral movement possible ✓ Identity and device verification per-request ✓ Works from anywhere (no network dependency) ✓ Better user experience ✓ Reduced attack surface Migration Path: 1. Deploy ZTNA for new apps 2. Migrate existing apps progressively 3. Deprecate VPN for end users 4. Keep VPN only for legacy (temporary)

Application Zero Trust Requirements: AUTHENTICATION: ✓ SSO via central IdP (no app-local accounts) ✓ Modern protocols (OIDC/SAML) ✓ Per-application MFA policies ✓ Session management AUTHORIZATION: ✓ Fine-grained permissions ✓ API-level authorization ✓ Scope-based access tokens ✓ Consent management API SECURITY: ✓ OAuth 2.0 for authorization ✓ Short-lived access tokens ✓ Token validation on every request ✓ Rate limiting ✓ API gateway enforcement APPLICATION INVENTORY: ✓ Discover all applications (shadow IT) ✓ Risk categorization ✓ Integration with IdP ✓ Deprecate legacy apps

Navigate to: Entra ID → Enterprise applications Integration Priority: 1. Business-critical apps (ERP, CRM) 2. Apps with sensitive data 3. Apps accessed by external users 4. Remaining internal apps For Each Application: SAML Integration: → Add application → Create your own → Configure SAML → Upload IdP metadata → Configure attribute mapping → Test SSO OIDC Integration: → App registrations → New registration → Configure redirect URIs → Create client secret (or use certificates) → Configure scopes/permissions Conditional Access per App: → Create CA policy targeting specific app → Require MFA → Require compliant device → Block risky sign-ins Shadow IT Discovery: → Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps → Discover cloud apps → Risk assessment → Sanction or block

# AWS API Gateway with JWT Authorization # Create authorizer for Cognito/OIDC aws apigateway create-authorizer \ --rest-api-id abc123 \ --name CognitoAuthorizer \ --type COGNITO_USER_POOLS \ --provider-arns arn:aws:cognito-idp:us-east-1:123:userpool/xxx # Or custom JWT authorizer (Lambda) aws apigateway create-authorizer \ --rest-api-id abc123 \ --name JWTAuthorizer \ --type TOKEN \ --authorizer-uri arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:123:function:jwt-auth # Apply authorizer to method aws apigateway put-method \ --rest-api-id abc123 \ --resource-id xyz789 \ --http-method GET \ --authorization-type COGNITO_USER_POOLS \ --authorizer-id auth123 # API Gateway Best Practices: # 1. Validate JWTs on every request # 2. Check token scopes match API requirements # 3. Use short-lived tokens (< 1 hour) # 4. Log all API requests # 5. Rate limit per client/user # 6. Use mTLS for service-to-service

# Istio Authorization Policy (Zero Trust for Microservices) # Deny all by default apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1 kind: AuthorizationPolicy metadata: name: deny-all namespace: production spec: {} # Empty spec = deny all --- # Allow frontend to call backend with valid JWT apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1 kind: AuthorizationPolicy metadata: name: backend-policy namespace: production spec: selector: matchLabels: app: backend action: ALLOW rules: - from: - source: principals: ["cluster.local/ns/production/sa/frontend"] when: - key: request.auth.claims[iss] values: ["https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-id/v2.0"] --- # Require mTLS for all traffic apiVersion: security.istio.io/v1beta1 kind: PeerAuthentication metadata: name: default namespace: production spec: mtls: mode: STRICT

Data Zero Trust Requirements: DATA CLASSIFICATION: ✓ Automatic classification ✓ Sensitivity labels ✓ Visual markings ✓ Data owner identification DATA PROTECTION: ✓ Encryption at rest ✓ Encryption in transit (TLS 1.3) ✓ Customer-managed keys ✓ Rights management (DRM) DATA LOSS PREVENTION (DLP): ✓ Content inspection ✓ Block sensitive data exfiltration ✓ Endpoint DLP ✓ Cloud DLP ACCESS CONTROL: ✓ Data-level permissions ✓ Time-limited access ✓ Access logging ✓ Anomaly detection Classification Levels: ├── Public (Green) ├── Internal (Yellow) ├── Confidential (Orange) ├── Highly Confidential (Red) └── Restricted (Black)

Navigate to: compliance.microsoft.com → Information protection Create Sensitivity Labels: → Labels → Create a label Label: Highly Confidential - Scope: Items (files, emails) - Encryption: ✓ Encrypt content ✓ Assign permissions now ✓ Users: Specific users/groups ✓ Permissions: Co-Author ✓ Offline access: 7 days ✓ Content expires: Never - Content marking: ✓ Header: "HIGHLY CONFIDENTIAL" ✓ Footer: "Do not distribute" ✓ Watermark: User email - Auto-labeling: ✓ Credit card numbers ✓ SSN patterns ✓ Custom regex patterns Publish Labels: → Label policies → Create policy - Labels to publish: All labels - Users: All users - Policy settings: ✓ Require justification to remove label ✓ Require users to apply label ✓ Default label for documents: General

# AWS Data Protection for Zero Trust # 1. S3 Default Encryption (SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS) aws s3api put-bucket-encryption \ --bucket my-bucket \ --server-side-encryption-configuration '{ "Rules": [{ "ApplyServerSideEncryptionByDefault": { "SSEAlgorithm": "aws:kms", "KMSMasterKeyID": "arn:aws:kms:xxx" }, "BucketKeyEnabled": true }] }' # 2. Block public access (organization level) aws s3control put-public-access-block \ --account-id 123456789012 \ --public-access-block-configuration \ BlockPublicAcls=true,\ IgnorePublicAcls=true,\ BlockPublicPolicy=true,\ RestrictPublicBuckets=true # 3. Macie for sensitive data discovery aws macie2 enable-macie aws macie2 create-classification-job \ --job-type ONE_TIME \ --s3-job-definition '{ "bucketDefinitions": [{ "accountId": "123456789012", "buckets": ["my-bucket"] }] }' # 4. KMS key policy - require encryption context # 5. S3 Object Lock for immutability # 6. VPC endpoints for private access

Microsoft Purview DLP: → Data loss prevention → Policies → Create policy Policy: Block Credit Card Sharing Locations: ✓ Exchange email ✓ SharePoint sites ✓ OneDrive accounts ✓ Teams chat and channel ✓ Devices Conditions: - Content contains: Credit card number - Content is shared with: People outside organization Actions: - Block sharing with external users - Encrypt content - Notify user with policy tip - Alert admin User Overrides: - Allow override with business justification - Require report to compliance team Testing: 1. Create test mode policy first 2. Review matches in activity explorer 3. Tune conditions to reduce false positives 4. Enable enforcement

Continuous Access Evaluation (CAE): Traditional: Token valid until expiration (1 hour) CAE: Token revoked in near real-time on critical events Critical Events That Trigger Re-evaluation: - User account disabled - User password changed - MFA credentials changed - Admin revokes all tokens - High-risk user detected - Network location changes Enable CAE: → Conditional Access → Session controls → Customize continuous access evaluation: Enabled Supported Apps: - Exchange Online - SharePoint Online - Teams - Microsoft Graph Result: Before CAE: Disabled user access for up to 1 hour After CAE: Disabled user blocked within minutes Configure Strict Location Enforcement: → Enable strict location enforcement → Token reevaluated on IP change

Continuous Risk Assessment Signals: IDENTITY SIGNALS: - Sign-in from new location - Sign-in from new device - Impossible travel - Password spray attack - Credential stuffing - Token anomaly DEVICE SIGNALS: - Compliance state change - Malware detected - Jailbreak detected - Configuration drift NETWORK SIGNALS: - Connection from Tor - VPN usage - Anonymous proxy - Unusual bandwidth BEHAVIOR SIGNALS: - Unusual file access patterns - Mass download/deletion - Off-hours access - Sensitive data access Response Actions (Automated): - Low risk: Log and monitor - Medium risk: Step-up authentication - High risk: Block and alert - Critical: Terminate session, disable account

# Microsoft Sentinel UEBA Configuration # Enable UEBA # Settings → Settings → UEBA → Enable # Configure entity behavior # Entities tracked: Users, Devices, IP Addresses # Anomaly Detection Rules: # 1. Anomalous login # 2. Anomalous Azure AD activity # 3. Anomalous Office 365 activity # 4. First access to resource # 5. Unusual data access # Create Analytics Rule for Insider Threat # Analytics → Create → Scheduled query rule let threshold = 100; let timeframe = 1h; OfficeActivity | where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe) | where Operation in ("FileDownloaded", "FileSyncDownloadedFull") | summarize DownloadCount = count() by UserId | where DownloadCount > threshold | project UserId, DownloadCount, TimeGenerated # Response Playbook: # 1. Alert security team # 2. Disable user account (high severity) # 3. Create incident # 4. Start investigation

# Configure Token Lifetimes (Zero Trust = Shorter) # Using Microsoft Graph API # Create token lifetime policy POST https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/policies/tokenLifetimePolicies { "definition": [ "{\"TokenLifetimePolicy\":{\"Version\":1,\"AccessTokenLifetime\":\"01:00:00\",\"MaxAgeSessionSingleFactor\":\"08:00:00\"}}" ], "displayName": "ZeroTrust-ShortTokens", "isOrganizationDefault": true } # Zero Trust Token Recommendations: # Access Token: 1 hour (default, can't shorten further) # Refresh Token (Single Factor): 8 hours # Refresh Token (MFA): 24 hours # Session (Single Factor): 8 hours # Session (MFA): 24 hours # Conditional Access Sign-in Frequency: # → Session controls → Sign-in frequency # → Enforce: Every 4 hours (high security apps) # Force re-auth for sensitive operations: # → Configure step-up authentication for: # - Password change # - MFA registration # - Privileged actions

Cloud Zero Trust via CSPM: Microsoft Defender for Cloud: → Environment settings → Enable all plans Coverage: ✓ CSPM (Cloud Security Posture Management) ✓ CWP (Cloud Workload Protection) ✓ Defender for Servers ✓ Defender for Containers ✓ Defender for Storage ✓ Defender for Databases Security Recommendations: - Enable MFA for accounts with owner permissions - Remove deprecated accounts - Enable encryption at rest - Enable network security groups - Disable public access to storage - Enable diagnostic logging Secure Score: - Target: 80%+ for Zero Trust - Prioritize by impact and difficulty - Track improvement over time Multi-Cloud: → Connect AWS accounts → Connect GCP projects → Unified security view

Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps (CASB): Cloud Discovery: → Discover → Cloud app catalog - 31,000+ apps assessed - Risk score based on 80+ factors - Shadow IT visibility App Governance: → Policies → App governance - Monitor OAuth app permissions - Detect overprivileged apps - Revoke suspicious app access Session Policies: → Policies → Conditional Access App Control - Real-time monitoring - Block downloads from unmanaged devices - Apply DLP in real-time - Block upload of malware Activity Policies: → Policies → Activity policy - Detect mass downloads - Detect external sharing - Detect admin account compromise - Alert on suspicious activity File Policies: → Policies → File policy - Scan for sensitive content - Apply labels automatically - Quarantine risky files

# Zero Trust for Infrastructure as Code # 1. Scan IaC templates before deployment # Checkov - open source IaC scanner pip install checkov checkov -d ./terraform --framework terraform # 2. Enforce policies in CI/CD # GitHub Actions example name: IaC Security Scan on: [push, pull_request] jobs: scan: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - uses: actions/checkout@v4 - name: Run Checkov uses: bridgecrewio/checkov-action@master with: directory: terraform/ framework: terraform soft_fail: false # Fail pipeline on issues # 3. Policy as Code (OPA/Rego) # Deny public S3 buckets package terraform.aws deny[msg] { resource := input.resource.aws_s3_bucket[name] resource.acl == "public-read" msg := sprintf("S3 bucket %v has public ACL", [name]) } # 4. Drift Detection # Terraform Cloud/Enterprise # Detect when actual state differs from code

Workload Identity Zero Trust Principles: NO LONG-LIVED CREDENTIALS: ✗ Service account keys ✗ Hardcoded secrets ✗ Static API keys USE FEDERATED IDENTITY: ✓ AWS IAM Roles (IRSA for EKS) ✓ Azure Managed Identity ✓ GCP Workload Identity ✓ SPIFFE/SPIRE for multi-cloud WORKLOAD ATTESTATION: ✓ Verify workload identity before issuing credentials ✓ Check workload integrity ✓ Validate deployment context LEAST PRIVILEGE: ✓ Minimal permissions per workload ✓ Scoped to specific resources ✓ Time-limited where possible SECRETS MANAGEMENT: ✓ Fetch secrets at runtime (not baked in) ✓ Automatic rotation ✓ Audit secret access ✓ Solutions: HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager

Zero Trust Implementation Phases: PHASE 1: FOUNDATION (Months 1-3) ├── Deploy MFA for all users ├── Integrate critical apps with SSO ├── Enable Identity Protection ├── Deploy endpoint protection ├── Baseline network segmentation └── Establish monitoring/logging PHASE 2: ENHANCEMENT (Months 4-6) ├── Implement Conditional Access policies ├── Deploy device compliance ├── Configure PIM for privileged access ├── Implement data classification ├── Deploy CASB for SaaS visibility └── ZTNA pilot for new apps PHASE 3: OPTIMIZATION (Months 7-9) ├── Phishing-resistant MFA rollout ├── Micro-segmentation implementation ├── Full ZTNA deployment ├── Automated lifecycle workflows ├── DLP policy enforcement └── Continuous verification (CAE) PHASE 4: MATURITY (Months 10-12) ├── ML-driven risk scoring ├── Automated response playbooks ├── Full visibility and analytics ├── Regular posture assessments └── Continuous improvement process Success Metrics: - MFA adoption: 100% - SSO coverage: 95%+ - Mean time to revoke: < 1 hour - Secure score: 80%+